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DECOUPLING EMPLOYMENT
by
Marcia L. McCormick∗
The protected class approach to employment discrimination has not solved
the problem of discrimination or of a just distribution of resources. Not
only do race and sex prejudice continue to exist, but material and
subjective disadvantage continues to be strongly linked to race and sex.
While our laws have made social changes, progress on those changes
stalled in the 1980s. Some might even say that the protected class approach
to discrimination has actually entrenched inequality more deeply into our
social fabric.
This Article seeks a purpose-driven approach to finding solutions to the
problems of discrimination, asking why it is that we prohibit
discrimination and what we hope to accomplish through law. It advocates
for a focus on some baseline of substantive equity for everyone, separated
from particular employment relationships, and not contingent on identity.
Such a shift might take pressure off of our antidiscrimination laws, which
in turn might allow them and the market to operate to promote more
equality for historically disadvantaged groups.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The world envisioned by Gene Rodenberry in his Star Trek series, a
world further developed in subsequent spinoff series, has solved the
problem of discrimination on Earth. There is no more discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, sexual identity, religion, or even
planet of origin. There is also no more want. The “replicator” produces
anything needed at a voice command, and the transporter and fasterthan-light-speed space travel combine to take people “where no one has
gone before.” While that world is science fiction, the aspirations for that
world exist in our real world very strongly, and have for a long time.
It seems that there are two paths to follow to get to that world, or at
least to get closer to it. One path would be to eliminate discrimination, so
that resources could be divided much more equally; this, in turn, would
reduce want significantly. The other path would eliminate scarcity, or
take care of the physical needs of people so that they would no longer
need to compete for basic resources. This lack of competition would,
over time, break down arbitrary barriers. This is because so little would
be at stake in the outcome of any given human interaction governing
access to those resources that extraneous, irrelevant matters would not be
considered as often. We have chosen the first path, with mixed results.
This Article suggests that we think harder about the second.
The protected class approach to employment discrimination has not
solved the problems of discrimination or the uneven distribution of
resources. Not only do race and sex prejudice continue to exist, but a
person’s level of well-being continues to be strongly linked to race and
sex. While our laws have made social changes, those changes stalled in
the 1980s, and we have made little progress on measures of equality
since. Some might even say that the protected class approach to
discrimination has actually entrenched inequality more deeply into our
social fabric.
This Article, part of Lewis & Clark Law School’s Business Law Fall
Forum, The Protected-Class Approach to Antidiscrimination Law: Logic,
Effects, Reform, seeks a purpose-driven approach to finding solutions to
the problems of discrimination, asking why it is that we prohibit
discrimination and what we hope to accomplish through law. Beginning
with those first principles, as if we were starting with a clean slate, might
illuminate ways to reform the current system.
We prohibit employment discrimination for deontological reasons
and for instrumental reasons. Deontologically, we prohibit
discrimination because it is wrong, because all human beings are
fundamentally equal, with equal dignity and deserving of equal rights.
Instrumentally, we prohibit discrimination because systematically
disadvantaging a group or limiting access to social goods can create an
underclass of people whose talents are wasted and who are more likely to
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engage in social unrest. When disadvantages persist intergenerationally,
that underclass can become permanent, increasing the likelihood of
unrest and cementing a loss of talent that would otherwise serve the
public good.
Thus, although our laws that prohibit employment discrimination
speak in terms of formal equality, they also seek to improve substantive
equality by creating conditions for people to access social goods such as
jobs. Over time, formal equality should, in theory, allow people to
develop their individual talents without having disadvantage imposed on
the basis of their status. This, in turn, will result in greater substantive
equality among groups.
But it has not worked. Our focus on protected classes and formal
equality has instead distracted us from this goal, and has been used to
justify cementing the effects of prior discrimination onto subsequent
generations. So what if we removed the substantive piece from the
equation? We must also provide for greater substantive equality, so that
workplace discrimination is no longer causing that particular injury or
responsible for that particular cure.
We use work as a delivery device for most of our social policies. Work
is the mechanism by which we seek to distribute social goods in a just
manner. The employment relationship is so overburdened by all of this
that the prohibition on employment discrimination because of protected
class status cannot serve the substantive equality goal. Ultimately, we have
put private sector employers in the role of gatekeepers to our social safety
net. And they are simply too powerful and unaccountable to serve in that
role.
If we decouple those policies from the employment relationship, we
might solve two problems: (1) we might get to our goal of substantive
equality faster; and (2) we might make race, color, national origin, sex,
or religion less relevant to the need for employment, allowing employee
choice to create a labor market that could operate to drive out
discrimination and free up employer resources to allow more risk-taking
in choosing employees.
Part II of this Article will show just how much social policy is
accomplished through the employment relationship. Given that context,
Part III will identify what the goals of employment discrimination law are
and what our legal approach currently is, highlighting some of the
problems with the protected class approach. Part IV will explore which
social policies and programs can be decoupled from the employment
relationship. Part V will conclude and discuss how that decoupling might
affect employment decisions.
II. SOCIAL POLICY AND WORK
As I write this Article, the media is in an all-out frenzy about the
economy in the United States and globally. Congress just went through a
very messy process to raise the country’s debt limit, Standard & Poor’s
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reduced the country’s bond rating, and trading on the stock markets is
1
extremely volatile. A USA Today/Gallup poll conducted on August 2,
2011, the day after the bill to raise the debt ceiling was passed, showed
that more people disapproved of the agreement than approved of it, and
nearly half of those polled thought that the agreement would make the
2
economy worse. By the end of that week, economic confidence plunged
3
to its lowest levels since March 2009, in the depth of recession. And the
4
worry is that we are about to enter a “double dip” recession.
The focus to resolve the economic problems? Jobs. As the President
said the day after the debt ceiling agreement was reached:
[W]e have now averted what could have been a disastrous blow to
the economy. . . . In the meantime, the American people have been
continuing to worry about the underlying state of the economy,
about jobs, about their wages, about reduced hours, about fewer
customers. . . . So I’m meeting with my Cabinet here to make sure
that, even as they have been throughout these last several weeks,
they are redoubling their efforts to focus on what matters most to
the American people, and that is: how are we going to put people
back to work; how are we going to raise their wages, increase their
security; how are we going to make sure that they recover fully, as
families and as communities, from the worst recession we’ve had
5
since the Great Depression.
The employment relationship is clearly central to our economic policies.
Drilling down, our economic policy is closely tied to our social
policies as well, and many aspects of our social policies are carried out
through the employment relationship. As our economic woes and the
push for health care reform have demonstrated, our economy and social
1

See STANDARD & POOR’S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM RATING LOWERED
TO ‘AA+’ ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE 2–4 (2011);
Ken Sweet, Dow Plunges After S&P Downgrade, CNN MONEY (Aug. 8, 2011, 4:48 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/08/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm; The Debt
Ceiling: Scheme, Stonewall and Fulminate, ECONOMIST, July 23, 2011, at 65.
2
Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans Oppose than Favor Debt Ceiling Agreement, GALLUP
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148802/Americans-Oppose-Favor-DebtCeiling-Agreement.aspx.
3
The National Bureau of Economic Research measured the recession as beginning
in December of 2007, Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/dec2008.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011),
and ending in June 2009, Business Cycle Dating Committee Meeting Report, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RES. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html.
4
24/7 Wall St., 10 Signs a Double-Dip Recession Is Around the Corner, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 1, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/10signs-a-double-dip-recession-is-around-the-corner/242888/.
5
Remarks Prior to a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters, 2011
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 544, at 1 (Aug. 3, 2011). Later that same day at a Democratic
National Committee event, the President again focused on the jobs message. Remarks
at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser in Chicago, Illinois, 2011 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 545, at 2–4 (Aug. 3, 2011) (making remarks regarding quality of life
and economic growth, all related to jobs and job losses).
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welfare system depend upon an effectively functioning system of
employment. Work is the vehicle through which we distribute money and
social goods. For example, health care and support during the post-work
period of retirement are both primarily effectuated through the
employment relationship. While employers do not have to provide health
benefits or retirement benefits, many do, and that is the primary means
6
by which people obtain health care and save for retirement. Moreover,
our Social Security and Medicare systems are dependent on the
employment relationship and taxes collected from earned income.
It is not only health care and retirement that we provide for through
employment. It is also income insurance, like unemployment insurance
7
and disability insurance. And more fundamentally, work is the means by
which people get resources necessary for housing, education, food, and
other things required for subsistence. We even use employment to
accomplish the redistributive goal of support for groups in the lowest
socioeconomic tiers. There is very little direct government payment to
8
poor people in this country, and in fact, about fifteen years ago we
reformed the welfare system to promote work as the primary delivery
9
device for welfare support. In a very real sense, work is our social safety
net.
Work is not only a distributional device; it is itself, at least in the
aggregate, a social good to be distributed. To allow the broadest
distribution of this social good and the other social goods to which work
serves as the gateway, we regulate work to enable larger numbers of
people access to jobs. So we allow workers to bargain collectively for
10
things like job security, we give incentives to employers to limit the
11
number of hours any particular employee can work, and we require at
6

See CRAIG COPELAND, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 311,
EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION 4 (2007), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_11-20074.pdf; David A. Hyman & Mark
Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
23, 23–24 (2001) (concerning the provision of health insurance); William J. Wiatrowski,
Changing Landscape of Employment-Based Retirement Benefits, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm (documenting the
way people save for retirement and the trends in the types of plans available to
employees).
7
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Life and Disability Insurance Benefits, PROGRAM
PERSPECTIVES, Dec. 2010, at 1–3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives
/program_perspectives_vol2_issue7.pdf (collecting statistics of disability insurance
coverage for American employees); Sachin S. Pandya, Retrofitting Unemployment
Insurance To Cover Temporary Workers, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 907, 907 (1999).
8
See Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: The Earned
Income Tax Credit, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 689, 689–90 (2011) (noting the “erosion of the
traditional welfare system” and stating that the federal income tax system is now
“[t]he primary means of providing cash assistance to lower-income families”).
9
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2323.
10
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159–161 (2006).
11
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
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least in some cases a minimum wage to ensure a subsistence level amount
12
of income. We regulate within the employment relationship as well—to
13
ensure the health and safety of employees, to ensure that they can
14
continue working as long as feasible, and to ensure that politically less
15
powerful groups are not systematically denied access to employment,
and, through employment, social goods that come with it.
So how did we get to this point? Through a combination of
happenstance and design. The virtue of work has long been part of
American culture and is at least to some extent an outgrowth of the
Protestant work ethic, an ethic that many of our first settlers considered
16
central to their religious beliefs. For example, the virtue in work was
evident in the welfare-to-work movement, and even continues today, as
shown by the media coverage of the emotional toll that unemployment
and underemployment is wreaking on people in the current economic
17
crisis. This country has also long been seen as the land of opportunity, a
place to emigrate to, a place where anyone can become rich through
hard work.
While that description begins to explain the centrality of work to
American identity, the use of work to deliver other social goods
happened, at least originally, less by design. Great economic disruptions
in U.S. history have caused huge shifts in employment. For example,
during the Great Depression, our political leaders saw work as central to
recovery, and much of the legislation making up the New Deal was
18
enacted to spread work to more people and to raise wages. During
World War II, amid labor shortages and to prevent war profiteering, the
federal government imposed strict price controls, which meant that

12

Id. § 206.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006).
14
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006);
see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117 (2006).
15
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
16
See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM
(1905), reprinted in THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1 (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds. & trans., 2002).
17
E.g., Michelle Hirsch & Eric Pianin, Mental Toll of Extended Unemployment Looms
Large, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/mentaltoll-of-extended-usnemployment-looms-large/2011/09/27/gIQAD5Lv9K_story.html; Alix
Spiegel, Economic Crisis, Unemployment Take Emotional Toll, NPR (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100600029; Long-Term Joblessness
Takes Emotional, Spiritual Toll on ‘99ers’, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec10/99ers_08-06.html.
18
See Alan Brinkley, The New Deal Experiments, in THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN
LIBERALISM: THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACIES 1, 11, 13 (William H. Chafe ed., 2003)
(describing the National Industrial Recovery Act and subsequent successful pieces of
legislation); Greg Hannsgen & Dmitri Papadimitriou, Did the New Deal Prolong or
Worsen the Great Depression?, CHALLENGE, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 63, 66–67, 72–74.
13

Do Not Delete

2012]

5/9/2012 2:36 PM

DECOUPLING EMPLOYMENT

505

19

wages were capped and not allowed to increase. In order to attract the
most qualified employees, many employers began offering health
20
insurance and pensions as forms of compensation. That way, real
compensation could be higher than the wage controls would allow. The
rise of unions, which bargained for these kinds of benefits at a time when
labor was in shorter supply, meant that even non-unionized employers
21
had to provide the same kinds of benefits to remain competitive. So to
some extent, we simply got in the habit of using work in this way.
More recently, we have ramped up the use of work to deliver social
goods. The welfare reform passed during the Clinton Administration
focused on moving the poor from receiving direct payments from the
22
government to at least partly supporting themselves with work. Federal
policy also shifted to use the income tax system, and the earned income
tax credit in particular, as the primary method of redistributive assistance
23
for the poor. Of course to be benefitted by an income tax credit, a
person must have some income, which generally requires being
employed. While at one time we engaged in more direct wealth
redistribution to support at least some of our safety net programs, the
24
reductions in the capital gains tax and estate tax in the last couple of
decades has meant that any appreciable wealth redistribution for safety
net programs has been significantly reduced. We now focus almost
exclusively on individual income to accomplish the redistribution. And
although one proposal for the recent reform of health care would have
removed health insurance from the employment context, the reform
enacted instead used the employment relationship as a primary means to
provide health insurance, reinforcing the link between employment and
25
health care.

19

See Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 279, 280
(1993); Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 25.
20
Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 25.
21
Id. at 25–26.
22
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 103, 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112–13, 2323 (replacing Aid to
Families with Dependent Children to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and
requiring recipients to begin working).
23
Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 8, at 689–90.
24
See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, §§ 501, 511, 646, 115 Stat. 38, 69–70, 85, 144 (reducing the estate tax); Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 301, 117 Stat.
752, 758 (reducing the capital gains tax); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate
Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 155 (2009)
(describing the estate tax as designed to prevent concentrations of wealth and
describing the temporary repeal of the tax in 2001).
25
Some employers will have to offer their employees coverage. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253–54, (2010)
(imposing tax penalties on employers of at least fifty employees who do not offer
affordable minimum coverage for employees). Other employers may be eligible to
receive subsidies to offer their employees coverage. Id. § 1421, 124 Stat. at 237–38. And
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Despite our efforts to distribute work, and thus social goods,
equitably, we do not seem to be accomplishing that goal. The U.S. workforce lacks racial and gender equality under almost any measure:
26
employment rates, wages, job integration, and labor force participation.
Income and wealth inequality are growing, and they are growing in a
27
gendered and racially disparate manner. Sex and race segregation in
the labor market, while less severe than in the days of legal (and even
legally required) segregation, remain high; men of color and women of
28
all colors are concentrated in lower-paying jobs, exacerbating the
income inequality problem. Moreover, the effects of the recent recession
29
hit people of color and women harder than it did white men. The next
Part will describe how our laws against employment discrimination were
supposed to remedy this problem and why they are less effective than we
might hope.
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE PROBLEMS WITH
THE PROTECTED CLASS APPROACH
Even though work is central to our economic system—or maybe
because it is—neither legislatures nor courts seem very interested in
interfering with the employment relationship. The default rule which
most employers and certainly all labor and employment lawyers are
familiar with is that employment is at-will, which of course means that the
employee can be fired “for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at
30
all.” We simply tinker around the edges of that rule, prohibiting only

finally, the individual mandate will be enforced by a tax penalty enforced through the
income tax code. Id. §§ 1501, 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 242, 909.
26
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, at 2 & n.5, 5–6 (2006); R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination
and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1171, 1184 (2006);
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 353,
353 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899,
900 (2005).
27
MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS WEALTH AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 15, 28–32 (2010); RAKESH KOCHHAR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND
HISPANICS 1 (2011), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDTWealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.
28
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1025, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S
EARNINGS IN 2009, at 2, 4 chart 4, 9–34 tbl.2 (2010); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
REPORT 1026, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2009, at 2, 3
(2010).
29
See KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 27, at 10, 12 (reporting that minorities
experienced a greater rate of home foreclosures, a greater rate of unemployment, and a
greater drop in household income than did whites).
30
Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. Unit A
July 1981); see also Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884)
(describing at-will employment as allowing termination “for good cause, for no cause
or even for cause morally wrong”).
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very few employment actions that are motivated by a few narrow
categories of status or conduct. One of these prohibitions, of course, is
the prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of
membership in certain protected classes. Employers may not take adverse
employment actions against employees because of the employees’ race,
31
32
33
color, national origin, religion, sex, age, or disability.
Choosing to focus on these statuses made sense given this country’s
history of excluding some people from work and other social goods
because of their race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, or
disability. But the statutes enacted to prohibit discrimination framed the
protected classes in neutral terms, while that history of exclusion was not
neutral.
A. Neutral Framing and Formal Equality
Consider the wording of the antidiscrimination provisions of the Ku
Klux Klan Acts, the civil rights statutes enacted during Reconstruction:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
34
kind, and to no other.
And:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
35
property.
This language, framed in terms of equalizing others with whites,
recognized that de jure discrimination had privileged white people and
36
had disadvantaged people of other races. The language appears to be
designed to allow the government to take actions that lift up people who
were not white even if that might foreclose some opportunity for a white
person.

31

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
33
42 U.S.C. § 12112.
34
Id. § 1981(a).
35
Id. § 1982.
36
Not all antidiscrimination law was framed race consciously during this time.
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were framed without reference to race
at all, and the Fifteenth Amendment provided that the right to vote may not be
abridged on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1.
32
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Compare the language of the Ku Klux Klan Acts to the language of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
37
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Title VII focuses on race as a category rather than on a particular race or
races, even though the discrimination in this country that led to
enactment of Title VII was against non-whites—primarily AfricanAmericans—just like the discrimination targeted by the Ku Klux Klan
Acts. All races did not suffer equally from the Jim Crow era, but all races
are protected by the language in Title VII.
The shift to neutrality made a difference in the operation of the law
as well. Consider the example of sex discrimination. At the turn of the
twentieth century, a number of states had enacted sex-specific labor
38
legislation that at least purported to improve the lives of women. Sexspecific labor legislation was then struck down by the courts when Title
39
VII was enacted, because Title VII required sex neutrality. This shift to
neutrality was accompanied by a strong commitment to formal equality.
Formal equality is sometimes also called equality of rights or equal
opportunity. In the law, formal equality usually refers either to the
absence of classification or to a mandate not to classify on the basis of
40
membership in a particular group. Formal equality is focused on the
individual rather than on the group that the individual may be a member

37

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding a law that limited
the number of hours per day and per week that women could work against a
constitutional challenge). The effects of those laws were not necessarily to improve
women’s lives, since they led to employers tending not to hire women. See BARBARA
ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND
THEORY 86–87, 105–06, 111–12 (2d ed. 1996); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S
WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 11–12, 24, 34–40 (1990);
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 191, 195–96, 201 (2003).
39
E.g., Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
40
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
108–21 (1976) (using the term antidiscrimination to describe anticlassification or
formal equality).
38
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of. Formal equality is nothing more or less than the Aristotelian
principle that likes should be treated alike while those who are not alike
42
should be treated differently.
An alternate approach to equality is substantive equality or equality
of outcomes or results. Substantive equality generally refers to equality in
the distribution of goods, resources, and power, and is often described as
43
embodying an anti-subordination principle. This anti-subordination
principle provides that actions enforcing the inferior status of historically
44
oppressed groups should be prohibited.
In the years since Title VII was enacted, formal equality has become
firmly entrenched as the primary equality norm both as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, and, generally, as a matter of legislative
45
policy and statutory interpretation. As a result, even so-called benign
classifications, classifications at least nominally aimed at benefitting social
groups historically oppressed, have been struck down as violating the
46
Constitution. Any facial race consciousness, and to a lesser extent, sex
41
See id. at 123, 126–27; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470,
1472 (2004).
42
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. V, at 145, 153, 265–67
(F.H. Peters trans., C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1881) (those who are equal should receive
equal shares and those not equal should not); see, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27, 31–32 (1885) (adopting this framework).
43
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1472–73.
44
Id.
45
Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681–82, (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), with id. at 2689–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority in Ricci uses
formal equality principles to hold that consideration of the racial impact of a test was
race discrimination. Justice Scalia’s concurrence suggests that a statute that requires
the government to provide substantive equality or equality of results may violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent puts the city’s actions in the
context of a long history of race discrimination, promoting the city’s actions as
necessary for substantive equality. See also Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality,
and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2008)
(discussing color-blind and color-conscious approaches by the Supreme Court);
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1473; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 946
(1975) (arguing that the Court should promote political equality and equality of
opportunity, but refrain from promoting economic equality).
46
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–08 (1989) (applying
strict scrutiny to a program that the government asserted was designed to benefit
racial minorities, and striking the program down on the ground that remedying
historical societal discrimination was not, by itself, a compelling governmental
interest); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (striking down
the exclusion of men from a nursing program argued to be a way to increase
opportunities for women). Of course, the policies at issue in those cases may not
actually have benefitted people of color or women, at least in some senses. Even if
they did, there may have been significant costs imposed as well. The policy barring
men from the Mississippi University for Women’s nursing program, for example, may
have served to promote sex segregation in the health services fields, segregation that
generally results in lower pay for jobs dominated by women. In addition, yet another
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consciousness, imperils a statute or government action. On the other
hand, laws neutral as to race or sex on their face generally are upheld as
valid exercises of government power even if the primary effects of such
48
laws are to penalize or benefit individuals on the basis of race or sex.
This approach to equality has, to at least some extent, frozen
historical inequities in place. Consider this allegory:
Two groups—one white, the other black—are playing a game of
poker. They have been playing the same game for some 400 years,
during which time the white group has cheated on numerous
occasions. The white group now announces that “from this day
forward, we will stop cheating.” “That’s fine,” the black group
responds, “but what are you going to do about all those poker chips
that have stacked up on your side of the table all these years.”
“We’re going to give them to current and future members of our

so-called benign classification was struck down in the Title VII context. UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (striking down a fetal protection policy
that affected only women as a violation of Title VII). The fetal protection policy at
issue in Johnson Controls “protected” women who could not prove they were infertile
from higher paying jobs that exposed them to higher levels of lead, on the ground
that the exposure ran the risk of injury to fetuses the women might be carrying. The
policy did not allow men to opt out of those jobs despite the link between male
exposure to lead and health risks to fetuses fathered. The ban on women serving in
ground combat positions in the military seems to present a similar kind of “benefit.”
Women are protected from some kinds of casualties, but their ability to advance
within the military is limited. Of course, if the reason for the ban is not the danger to
the women themselves, but instead the danger that male troops would face because
they would risk more to be chivalrous to protect their sisters-in-arms, then maybe the
policy would not be considered a “benign” classification.
47
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that a
prohibition of disparate impact, or discrimination in outcome, by private parties may
violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring private parties to discriminate by taking
race into account); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 747–48 (2007) (plurality opinion) (striking down the use of race to assign grade
school students to schools and noting that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”).
48
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68
(1977) (holding that only intentional discrimination violates the Equal Protection
Clause but that such intent can be shown by such factors as disproportionate impact,
the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific antecedent events,
departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the decisionmakers); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact
discrimination is not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment). But cf.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340–41 (1960) (considering redistricting that
changed the boundaries of a district “from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure” that excluded all but four or five of the 400 black voters and no white voter as
evidence of race-based intent); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding
that a neutral ordinance applied to put only Chinese laundry owners out of business
demonstrated intent to discriminate on the basis of race).
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group,” the white group replies. “So, whites will continue to benefit
49
from past cheating; that’s not fair,” the black group insists.

As this allegory might suggest, this approach to equality views social
goods as fixed resources, and race, sex, and each other status as a closed
system. In a closed system with scarce resources, every context is zerosum. To give to one is to take away from another. Privilege, in the sense
of a head start or relative advantage, is invisible, and the distribution of
resources and social goods appears natural, at least to those who have
50
more. Not only are real redistributions seen as punitive, but even
moderate changes in the mechanisms of distribution are seen as
impinging on “rights” that members of the dominant group have to a
51
continued disproportionate share.
Not all distributions of social goods like jobs are so explicitly
motivated by race or sex. Much of the distribution to future members of
the same group comes through the process of homosocial reproduction.
Organizational studies demonstrate that leaders or gatekeepers in a
variety of situations are likely to prefer subordinates who are socially
52
similar to themselves. This preference is a way that people hedge against
uncertainty in predicting good job performance or even in pinning down
53
what it is that marks good job performance. These gatekeepers may or
may not realize at a fully conscious level that they are taking race, sex, or
other protected characteristics into account; they are simply choosing
people who live in the “right” parts of town, belong to the “right”
organizations, went to the “right” schools, and do the “right” things in

49
ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 3
(3d ed. 2005).
50
People tend to attribute their successes to themselves, believing that they
achieved what they did through their own efforts. See Thomas Shelley Duval & Paul J.
Silvia, Self-Awareness, Probability of Improvement, and the Self-Serving Bias, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49 (2002); Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving
Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213, 213 (1975).
51
See Caron & Repetti, supra note 24, at 156–58 (documenting the way that
rhetoric has been used in the estate tax debate to gather support against explicitly
redistributive policies); Ronald Turner, On Palatable, Palliative, and Paralytic Affirmative
Action, Grutter-Style, in LAW, CULTURE & AFRICANA STUDIES 103, 107–08 (James L.
Conyers, Jr. ed., 2008) (discussing the role that rhetoric about harm to white
“innocents” serves in galvanizing opposition to affirmative action). Individuals seem
to generally favor equality of distributions in the abstract, when not applied to
themselves, but even when distributional changes are applied to others whom the test
subjects believe have greater ability or put in greater effort, at least white men, and to
a lesser extent, white women, value efficiency over equality. Philip A. Michelbach et
al., Doing Rawls Justice: An Experimental Study of Income Distribution Norms, 47 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 523, 527–31 (2003).
52
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 47–48, 54, 68 (1993).
53
Id. at 54, 61–63.
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54

their free time. Those people also tend to share the same race, sex, or
55
other protected status with the gatekeepers.
Distribution of tangible goods and wealth is not always carried out
through what we would ordinarily think about as discrimination. Much
wealth, at least, is built intergenerationally, and it is this fact that has led
56
to a huge racial wealth gap. People tend to transfer whatever wealth
they have to their descendants, and those descendents are usually of the
same race because of patterns of reproduction and marriage. Another
source of wealth is homeownership, and because of racial segregation in
housing, plus the racially disparate effects of the recent housing crisis,
black and Latino households have lost much of the wealth they might
57
have had even a couple of years ago.
The story is a little different for women. Although women can
inherit wealth to exactly the same extent as male heirs and are currently
outperforming men in educational achievement and thus have access to
58
wealth-building tools, women own less than forty percent of what men
own, in part because of the way work and family care are structured, and
in part because of what happens to women who never marry men or who
59
are no longer married to men.
Because it is difficult to link racially and sexually disparate effects to
some conscious decision to classify people on the basis of race or sex,
formal equality cannot do much to address them. Complicating this fact
is that even where there might be a decision in the background that
someone could point to, proving discrimination is a real challenge.
B. Narrowness of the Prohibition in an At-Will Background
As the foregoing discussion suggests, in terms of achieving social
transformation, formal equality is of very limited utility. Even apart from
social transformation, however, vindicating the interests of workers in any
level of job security or fair treatment at work on an individual level
indicates that prohibiting only a narrow class of decisions is also of
extremely limited utility.
When a person is injured by something that happened at work, if the
person lacks a collective bargaining agreement (which most of us lack),

54

See id. at 61–62.
See id. at 68; Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why
Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583,
1584 (2004) (considering “homosocial reproduction” in corporate boards).
56
Currently, the median wealth of white households is 20 times that of black
households and 18 times that of Hispanic households. KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 27,
at 1.
57
Id. at 1–2, 4.
58
CHANG, supra note 27, at 2.
59
Id. at 2, 8–10.
55
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that person has only a few statutory avenues for relief. In order to
pursue that relief, a person has to fit his or her story into what one of
61
those statutes prohibits. For the employment discrimination statutes,
that means first choosing one of the identities protected by Title VII and
categorizing oneself in that manner. That choice may not be problematic
for some people, but it may be for others. Requiring a person to adopt a
racial label—or reducing a person to that label, for example—may
impose something that person resists, or may be something that does not
describe that person’s identity well.
Additionally, the person has to fit what happened to him or her into
the relatively narrow box of what discrimination because of this status is
supposed to look like. Even if the person believes that his or her
protected status was the cause of the employer’s action, an outsider
viewing that situation might be skeptical, especially if the action itself
would not be a violation of any laws—and it is only the alleged motive
62
that makes it so.
The combination of the need to label oneself in a particular way and
to shoehorn the story into a narrow narrative is likely to translate into a
significant number of particularly weak-looking charges at the EEOC and
at least some weak-looking cases filed in court. And the presence of those
weak-looking cases may taint the stronger cases, either by diluting the
pool as a whole or by confirming the suspicion that many complaints of
discrimination are frivolous.
C. Intent and Problems of Proof and of Implicit Bias as the Mechanism for
Discrimination
The prohibition on discrimination is narrow in another way. For
practical purposes, the only forms of discrimination that are truly
recognized by courts are intentional discrimination and disparate
treatment. Although Title VII also prohibits disparate impact, its utility
seems to be fading, and judges seem to be very reluctant to enforce that
63
prohibition. Therefore, discriminatory intent is the single thing that
creates liability. But proving intent—what was actually inside a person’s
head when that person made the decision at issue—can be very difficult,
60

See Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 68–70 (2008); Joseph E. Slater, The
“American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53, 55 (2007).
61
See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77–80 (2007) (discussing the
narrowness of the protection against discrimination on the basis of race).
62
Id. at 79–82.
63
E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–73, 2675–76 (2009) (concluding
that the doctrine was judicially created, but not really a part of Title VII, and that it
was adopted much later by Congress only as a secondary goal); see also, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548, 2554 (2011) (failing to reach the plaintiff
class’s claims that subjective decision-making and a sexist corporate culture created a
disparate impact on women).
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especially when any reason other than the person’s protected status
64
means that no liability results.
Intent is problematic not just because of problems of proof, though.
The very meaning of intent—or when a person’s protected status causes
65
the decision-maker to take a particular action—is a bit unsettled.
Discrimination is often not a fully self-aware consideration of protected
status that a person has chosen to make; rather, our decision-making is
heavily influenced by processes that occur outside of our normal selfawareness, but which bias our actions in predictable and systematic
66
ways.
Cognitive psychological research demonstrates that our beliefs and
experiences filter our perception in fundamental ways, and the way that
67
we then perceive matters reinforces our beliefs recursively. According to
these studies, humans naturally classify things in the world in order to
function. The things in our world are infinitely varied, and we simply
68
cannot fully process the impact of each variation we encounter. So we
generalize about things—objects and people alike—based on a few
encounters with them. We then use those generalizations to define
categories, and in the future, quickly sort what we encounter into those
69
categories without reflection. We use the definitions of our categories to
define the thing we have encountered and to predict how that thing is
70
likely to act or be acted upon. This sorting function facilitates quick
judgments, makes the world seem more predictable, and allows us to act.
Although this process is important to our ability to function, relying
on categories—essentially creating group identities—has far-reaching
consequences. When we have assigned an object to a group, we then

64
See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508–09 (1993) (holding
that plaintiffs needed to prove that their protected class status was the reason for the
adverse employment action challenged, and that proving the asserted reason to be a
pretext was not necessarily enough).
65
See Marcia L. McCormick, Consensus, Dissensus, and Enforcement: Legal Protection
of Working Women from the Time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire to Today, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 683 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past
the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 913–25 (2005) (discussing the
debates over what “discriminate” means).
66
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995).
67
See id. at 1202; Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in 1 STUDIES IN CROSSCULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) [hereinafter Rosch, Human
Categorization]; Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27, 27–28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978)
[hereinafter Rosch, Principles].
68
See Rosch, Human Categorization, supra note 67, at 1–2.
69
Id. (“Since no organism can cope with infinite diversity, one of the most basic
functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment into classifications by
which non-identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent.”); Rosch, Principles, supra
note 67, at 27–28.
70
Krieger, supra note 66, at 1188–89.
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perceive it as more like other things within that group and less like things
71
outside of that group. This process gets personalized when people are
given group identities. Even when the distinction is arbitrary, as with
people randomly assigned to teams, people view members of their own
group (the “in-group”) as more like them, and others (the “out-group”)
as more different from them than they would if group identity had not
72
been assigned. We do not only assign other people to groups or get
assigned randomly; we also willingly identify ourselves with groups. That
process has similar important consequences: people who choose to
identify as part of an in-group are far less likely to identify differences
73
between members of the out-group.
74
Groups or categories are created by the “salience” of characteristics.
Once a characteristic, such as gender or race, becomes salient, or
noticeable, to a person, that characteristic defines a group. But what
becomes salient is neither inevitable nor natural. Individuals define what
71
Id. at 1186 (describing two studies and citing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes,
Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963) (finding
that, when lines were grouped, participants judged the comparative length of those
lines as more similar when they compared lines within the same group and more
different from each other when they compared a line to one in the other group than
the same people did when they compared the length of lines not assigned to any
group); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, J. SOC. ISSUES, Autumn 1969, at 79,
83–86 (describing the same experiment in more detail); Donald T. Campbell,
Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355
(1956) (finding that when nonsense syllables were linked to a spot on a spatial
continuum, participants tended to judge nonsense syllables linked to another spot as
more different than those that were not)).
72
Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS
160, 164–65 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Anne Locksley et
al., Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup
Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83 (1980); see also
David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Intergroup Relations, in
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L.
Hamilton ed., 1981).
73
David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of
the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 131 (John F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). Numerous studies that support this
assertion are summarized in Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived
Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup—Outgroup Perception, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 165, 168–73 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner eds., 1986) (commenting on studies that included things like asking
members of student groups to rate the similarity of members of their own and other
groups, asking members of student groups to assess the traits of members of their
own and different groups even when the students were given identical information
about the individual people they were being asked about, asking people to assess how
likely someone in their group would be to fit a stereotype and how likely someone
outside of their group would, and asking people with a particular opinion to rate the
similarity of people with the same or a different opinion).
74
See Krieger, supra note 66, at 1190 (describing how categorical structures are
triggered).
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is salient in any given context, often choosing what their culture defines
75
as salient. In other words, our choices may be constrained or structured
by the broader society we are a part of, but they are still choices. Because
choices about salience are within our control, we can control how our
76
brains categorize people into groups. The operation of choice makes
77
the effects of these cognitive shortcuts appropriate for regulation.
One such effect is the tendency to stereotype—essentially, to create a
cognitive shortcut that links personal traits with a salient characteristic in
order “to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining
78
information about people.” Once set, these cognitive shortcuts “bias[]
in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention,
and recall of information about other people,” and they influence
79
judgment continuously.
These cognitive shortcuts create expectations that transform the way
we perceive others, remember things about others, and interpret

75
That is not to say that in every instance individuals make a conscious choice
about which characteristics matter. Conscious adoption is possible, but individuals
also absorb information about what characteristics matter to others (and therefore
should matter to them) from exposure to the culture they live in. See HOWARD J.
EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973); Richard E. Nisbett et al.,
Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291,
291 (2001).
76
Even though some categories become salient because we absorb them, see
supra note 75 and accompanying text, the lack of fully self-aware adoption does not
mean that salience and categorizations are outside of our control. They do not
function entirely automatically and can be confronted and changed by conscious
effort. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 242–47, 255–56 (2002); Ann C. McGinley,
¡Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 415, 430–32 (2000); see also JACK MEZIROW, TRANSFORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF
ADULT LEARNING 186–88 (1991); Jack Mezirow, Transformation Theory of Adult Learning,
in IN DEFENSE OF THE LIFEWORLD: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT LEARNING 39, 39
(Michael R. Welton ed., 1995).
77
See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2003) (analogizing liability for discrimination
caused by cognitive bias to the law related to dangerous conditions on land); Michael
Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1241, 1248
(1999). But see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1226, 1228
(1999) (arguing that there should be no remedy for the kind of discrimination that is
caused by implicit bias).
78
Krieger, supra note 66, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of
Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 320–22 (2000). While this
description of how stereotypes are functioning may sound very benign, stereotypes in
a society with power imbalances such as ours have operated to perpetuate and even
aggravate those power imbalances.
79
Krieger, supra note 66, at 1188. Just as for salience, which defines groupness in
the first place, we decide what behaviors to attribute to particular groups either
consciously or through exposure to culture. David L. Hamilton, A CognitiveAttributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979).
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80

motivations for the actions of others. Memory is particularly tricky. We
tend to remember a person’s actions only if those actions fit our
stereotypes of that person, we tend to “remember” actions that fit our
stereotypes even if the person never engaged in those actions, and we
81
tend to forget actions that did not fit our stereotypes. Additionally, we
tend to assume that a person who acts consistently with a stereotype acted
because of innate characteristics—that this person will usually act this way
because he or she is this type of person—but a person who acts
inconsistently with a stereotype acted because of transitional or
situational factors—that this person does not usually act this way because
82
he or she is not this type of person. For example, if we believe that male
professionals tend not to have family responsibilities, then we are likely to
believe that a man who steps out of the office at 2:30 in the afternoon
must be going to a meeting and not picking up his children from school
83
even if he is, in fact, picking his children up from school.
And so discrimination occurs through an ongoing process of
interaction that often happens outside of our normal self-awareness, but
the impact of these cognitive biases does not stop there. The judgments
we make about situations that we observe but are not a part of are
colored in the same way through the same process. Consequently, those
who interpret and enforce the law are prone to the same kinds of biases
about people and situations that we all are. To the extent that those who
interpret and enforce the law tend to belong to majority groups and to
the extent that some stereotypes of women and people of color are
pervasive in our culture, they will tend to interpret the claims of women
and people of color as not constituting any sort of discrimination. Thus,
decision-makers bring into the decision-making process their own
worldviews about what discrimination is, what people who claim they
have been discriminated against are like, and what members of particular
races, sexes, religions, and national origins are like. These worldviews
influence the way that decision-makers interact with people and how they
view the interactions of others.
80

See Krieger, supra note 66, at 1200–09.
Id. at 1207–09 (summarizing research on stereotypes and memory); see also
Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1977).
82
Krieger, supra note 66, at 1204–07. For example, because women with children
are presumed to innately make their children, rather than their jobs, their first
priority, when a woman with children is late to work, her boss is likely to assume that
her innate characteristic of prioritizing childcare responsibilities was the cause. On
the other hand, because men are presumed to put work first, a man late for work may
be assumed to have been caught in traffic, a transitional cause. Joan C. Williams, The
Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases
and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003).
83
This example was given over lunch during Lewis & Clark Law School’s 16th
Annual Business Law Fall Forum by one of the attendees who related that her
husband, who was in a top leadership position at his company, nonetheless was
relieved at the assumption of his coworkers.
81
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D. Each Class Is Viewed as Discrete and Insular—The Problems of
Intersectionality
The prohibition on discrimination because of protected class status
is narrow in yet another way. Each status in Title VII is viewed as if it were
truly separate and capable of scientific identification, and as if people
only have one. This is not accurate. First, no status is bounded by bright
lines or as capable of scientific identification as we might think. It is
surprisingly difficult to identify what “race” or even “sex” mean. There
are debates about whether “sex” encompasses only the biological
differences that are true for all or nearly all women, or also differences in
84
behavior that are believed to be linked to sex. The debate over
balancing work and family is a great example of this. While women are
overwhelmingly more likely than men to be responsible within the family
for caregiving even when they are also wage-earners outside the home,
penalizing employees because they provide care is not considered sex
85
discrimination. Another classic example is present in grooming codes
that regulate behavior along gender lines: having sex-specific rules for
appearance is generally not considered to be discrimination, even when
employers classify men and women and prescribe different rules for
86
each. Finally, there are also debates about whether sexual identity or
sexual orientation are a part of what sex is or whether they are something
87
separable from sex. Race is even more clearly socially constructed,
despite the fact that many people believe that there are biological
88
differences among races.

84

Compare LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN (2006) (arguing that women
and men have different behavior linked to neurological differences), with CORDELIA
FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM CREATE
DIFFERENCE (2010) (pointing out the weaknesses in research linking behavior to
neurological differences and arguing that researchers’ biases make them construct
findings to support those differences), and REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM:
THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES (2010) (same).
85
See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–2, 14–15 (2000); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender
Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989).
86
See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding a requirement that women wear “full” makeup and men not wear any as not
discriminatory even though men and women were required to do different things).
87
See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008); Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761–65 (6th Cir. 2006); I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual
Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1159 (1991).
88
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity,
Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1455, 1459–60 (2002); John Levi Martin &
King-To Yeung, The Use of the Conceptual Category of Race in American Sociology, 1937–99,
18 SOC. F. 521, 521–22 (2003); see generally ANN MORNING, THE NATURE OF RACE: HOW
SCIENTISTS THINK AND TEACH ABOUT HUMAN DIFFERENCE (2011) (exploring different
conceptions of race held by scientists and students); Ian F. Haney López, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-
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Moreover, just as motives that mix protected-status and unprotected89
status reasons may create problems with proving causation, so do
motives that focus on one subgroup of a protected class. If only one
subgroup is affected by an employer’s decision, there may be no
discrimination against a member of that subgroup on the basis of the
larger status. Pregnancy is a classic example of this problem. Even though
90
all pregnant individuals are women, the class of people who are not
pregnant is comprised of both men and women. It was this lack of perfect
symmetry between the classes that led the Supreme Court to hold that
91
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination.
Another problem similar to the multiple motives problem occurs
because every one of us has multiple identities: we each have a race, a
sex, a religion (or lack of religion), a national origin, and a color.
Focusing on only one aspect of a person’s multiple identities tends to
obscure how those multiple identities acting together may have led to
what happened to them. Intersecting identities, though present in every
case, can become problematic for those for whom more than one
identity is actually visible, as when more than one identity is non-majority
and implicated in the case. For example, if a black woman is fired
because of stereotypes of black women, she may be found not to have
suffered any discrimination at all if those stereotypes differ from
stereotypes of white women or of black men. In such a situation, a
decision-maker would be likely to find that the woman was not
discriminated against because of her race, because other members of her
race (black men) did not suffer from application of the same stereotype.
That decision-maker would also likely find that she was not discriminated
against because of her sex, because other members of her sex (white
92
women) did not suffer from application of the same stereotype.
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (considering and rejecting a biological and hereditary
conception of race).
89
See Sullivan, supra note 65, at 937 & n.108.
90
More accurately, only people with at least a functioning uterus, whether they
identify as male or female, can currently become pregnant. At least three
transgendered men have borne children. Patrick Califia-Rice, Family Values: Two Dads
with a Difference—Neither of Us Was Born Male, VILLAGE VOICE (June 20, 2000),
http://www.villagevoice.com/2000-06-20/news/family-values (describing how he and
his partner Matt Rice had their son); Neil Nagraj, Meet the World’s Second ‘Pregnant
Man’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-0126/news/17943275_1_pregnant-man-paper-reports-scott-moore
(describing
the
pregnancy of Scott Moore); Guy Trebay, He’s Pregnant. You’re Speechless., N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2008, § 9 (Sunday Styles), at 1 (discussing the pregnancy of Thomas Beatie).
91
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976), superseded by statute,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)) (holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
was not discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII even though only women
were affected); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–96 (1974) (holding that
pregnancy and sex were analytically distinct under the Equal Protection Clause).
92
See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
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These problems with the protected class approach to employment
discrimination seem intractable. We have been using this approach for
the better part of the last 50 or 60 years, and while our society has made
significant gains, we seem not to have moved significantly forward for the
last 20 or 30 years. It is time to consider something new.
IV. SOCIAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS THAT CAN BE DECOUPLED
FROM THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
At the most fundamental level, physical security for individuals is
93
provided mostly by work. At one time, many people grew or raised their
own food and traded for the things they could not produce. With the
Industrial Revolution, that changed, and people began working for wages
in increasing numbers. Over time, the percentage of the population in
the workforce has continued to rise, and the primary source of support
for most households in the United States is the work of one or more
94
members of those households.
Today about 64% of those eligible to work in the United States do
95
work. That figure is the lowest that it has been in a decade, largely due
96
to the recent recession. And despite this, many of those working have
great difficulty purchasing the things necessary for physical security like
97
food and shelter. Even more are able to provide those things, but have

1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150. For more on how a focus on women’s rights has
disproportionately benefitted upper and middle class white women, see for example,
ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, NO TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE FUTURE OF
WOMEN ch. 4 (2002), Christine Stansell, White Feminists and Black Realities: The Politics
of Authenticity, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 251, 253 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992), and Julianne Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its Impact on Black Women, REV.
BLACK POL. ECON., Dec. 1985, at 47, 48 (1985).
93
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 532 (1997).
94
See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR, at xiv-xvii (1995) (describing the shift to
wage dependence); Karst, supra note 93, at 532.
95
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000 (data extracted Sept. 15,
2011, 4:32 PM) (showing labor force statistics from the Current Population Survey
from 2001 to 2011).
96
Id. Interestingly, although the recession ended in 2009, with the participation
rate a full percentage point lower than at the beginning of the recession, participation
fell just over another full percentage point from January 2010 until mid-year, 2011.
97
“In 2009 . . . about 43.6 million people, or 14.3 percent of the Nation’s
population, lived at or below the official poverty level,” and 10.4 million of those
worked. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1027, A PROFILE OF THE WORKING
POOR, 2009, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswp2009.pdf; see
generally DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA (2004)
(documenting the lives of those who live at or close to the poverty line despite
working).
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so little saved that any disruption in work or unforeseen expense can be
98
catastrophic.
Work is the primary way in which we ensure people have food,
shelter, and clothing, but much of our safety net comes from programs
that provide wage insurance or savings to substitute for wages. These
programs include unemployment insurance, most obviously, but also
disability insurance, workers’ compensation, social security, and pensions
and other retirement savings. The only social benefit that is not as clearly
linked to wage insurance is health insurance.
The social policies that can most easily be separated from the
employment relationship are the ones that already are, at least in part:
health care and old-age or work-related long-term disability support. The
policies that would be more difficult to separate are the subsistence kinds
of benefits. While philosophers and economists have proposed a basic
99
income for everyone, that idea has not taken root in the United States.
As explained before, health care was linked to the employment
relationship in the first place, at least in part, because doing so was a way
to provide compensation to employees otherwise barred by the price
controls that limited wages during World War II. Those benefits became
popular and were demanded by organized labor. Then, to compete for
workers, even workplaces that were not organized began to offer health
100
benefits.
There was additional logic to the link as well. By and large, we
distribute health care in this country by having individuals purchase
services from doctors and hospitals. We then secure the ability of people
101
to purchase those services by having them buy insurance. Health
insurance spreads the costs of purchasing health care among a group of
people with the idea that most of them at any given time will not need to
102
draw on the funds. Thus, to work well, the pool of those paying in and
bearing the risk has to have a low overall risk of needing to draw on the
funds. So the pool has to be big enough and diverse enough to

98

In the first quarter of 2011, 28% of consumers in North America reported that
they had no discretionary income. NIELSEN, GLOBAL ONLINE CONSUMER CONFIDENCE,
CONCERNS AND SPENDING INTENTIONS 7 (2011). A few years ago, the Nielsen Consumer
Confidence Survey found that only about 63% of consumers had little or no savings or
investments. See NIELSEN, CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, CONCERNS AND SPENDING
INTENTIONS 5 (2008), available at http://pl.nielsen.com/trends/documents/
GlobalReportConsumerConfidence2ndhalf07b.pdf.
99
See GIJS VAN DONSELAAR, THE RIGHT TO EXPLOIT: PARASITISM, SCARCITY, BASIC
INCOME 102–03 (2009); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF
ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM?, at 1–2 (1995); DANIEL RAVENTÓS, BASIC INCOME:
THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 8 (Julie Wark trans., 2007).
100
See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
101
See M. Kate Bundorf & Mark V. Pauly, United States, in THE WORLD BANK,
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE FOR PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: STRENGTH IN NUMBERS 253
(Alexander S. Preker et al. eds., 2010).
102
Id. at 253, 259.
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accomplish this. The employees of large employers formed relatively
good risk pools because they tended to be big enough and diverse
enough to spread the risk—or spread the cost—well. So providing
insurance through employment made sense from an insurance
103
perspective as well.
The link between old-age support and employment has a similar
history. Pensions were a way to provide compensation not otherwise
possible; they were popular, demanded by unions, and were then
104
demanded more broadly. They provided a means of support when a
person was no longer able to work because of infirmity associated with
aging. Pensions also had another function for employers, though. They
provided longevity and loyalty to the employer and were something of a
reward for a lifetime of service. The availability of pensions reduced
turnover, but also encouraged older workers to leave the workplace,
making room to bring in younger workers. The timing of those exits
105
became more predictable and thus more manageable.
Support for those who could once support themselves through work
but become unable to do so because of injury or disease is a bit more
complicated. Social Security was expanded in the 1950s to include
106
insurance for those who became disabled. Many employers provide
private insurance benefits as well, but not on as wide a scale as health
107
benefits.
Although there has been logic in the connection, there is no
necessary link between work and health care or work and old-age
support. More closely connected with work are those programs that were
designed to deal with income insecurity because of disruptions in work:
workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance benefits, for
example.
V. CONCLUSION: ON DECOUPLING
The point of this Article is not to argue for some sort of socialist or
Marxist utopian collective—from each according to his ability to each
according to his need—but to simply argue that we should stop using the
employment relationship to shoulder so much of the social justice
burden. From the employee’s perspective, it is easy to see why getting a
job and keeping that job is so important. The job is the key to some
minimal level of physical and financial security. It is the pathway to
health care and to old-age or disability benefits.
103

See Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 31.
See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 7 (2004).
105
Id. at 3–10.
106
See Edward D. Berkowitz & Wendy Wolff, Disability Insurance and the Limits of
American History, PUB. HISTORIAN, Spring 1986, at 65, 68.
107
See Life and Disability Insurance Benefits, supra note 7, at 1–2.
104
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Especially in labor markets with a large supply of labor, employees
have powerful motives to make sure that they do not give employers a
reason not to hire them or to discharge them once they are hired.
Employees subject to discrimination may not be able to afford to exercise
the one right they have under the at-will rule: to leave. And it is the
power of employees to leave a discriminatory environment that may give
employers an incentive to curb that discriminatory behavior. Several
scholars have argued that to the extent that discrimination is irrational,
108
the market should correct discrimination by itself. If there is any hope
of the markets working this way, employees have to be able to exercise
the one power they have: the power to quit.
Employees lack the practical power to quit because of the economic
dependence they have on an employer and the vulnerability they face as
a result of potential retaliation by their employer or potential future
109
employers if they allege that they have experienced discrimination.
This threat of retaliation affects the functioning of any market correction
for discrimination by suppressing accurate information about employers,
as well.
There are informational asymmetries on both sides of the
employment relationship. The prospective employee may not have access
to sufficient information on how an employer treats employees. Likewise,
employers may not have access to sufficient information on how well a
particular person will perform a job or fit into the workplace. These
asymmetries have different effects, but both are important. On the
employee side, the asymmetry prevents the market from eradicating
discrimination. If employees cannot talk about conditions at work, or
cannot talk about why they left, employees that take their places will not
know what the workplace is actually like. If they had access to this
information, new employees might decline to work for the employer,
shrinking the available labor pool, or they might demand higher wages to
put up with the environment—either one of which would drive up costs
to the employer. And as long as employees cannot talk about conditions
at work out of fear of retaliation, the asymmetries on the employee side
will remain.
The informational asymmetries that the employer experiences
interfere with the eradication of discrimination in a very different way.
Informational asymmetries create an environment of risk in hiring and in
dealing with employees. That risk is heightened by the administrative and
financial burden that comes with employing someone. Risk exacerbates

108

Jacob E. Gersen, Markets and Discrimination, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 696–714
(2007) (outlining the law and economics analyses of the extent of employment
discrimination and the potential forces driving it).
109
See Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193,
211–12 (2009) (summarizing arguments about employee vulnerability to retaliation).

Do Not Delete

524

5/9/2012 2:36 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:2
110

the likelihood that decisions will be influenced by implicit biases.
Without some way to give employers an incentive to examine their
implicit biases, the employment relationship is likely to remain mired in
their operation. If there were less at stake in the employment
relationship, however, perhaps implicit biases would be less likely to
operate. Moreover, with less at stake in the employment relationship, less
would be at stake in any threatened litigation arising out of the
employment relationship. Perhaps that, too, would make it less risky for
managers to examine their thought processes to avoid implicit biases.
Giving people a real voice is not only important to make real their
ability to exit the employment relationship; it is also a good in its own
right. People want to be heard. Those who feel wronged want a voice, to
tell their story in such a way that someone has to listen. Story-telling may
be part of the process of getting past the injury, of moving on. Or it may
be a way of warning others who might come after about dangers they may
face. Putting words to the pain may help contain it, to separate the pain
or the injury from oneself, as a first step to letting it go. Telling that story
and having it validated externally are thus important for the employees
who feel aggrieved.
Getting the story out is also important for the rest of us. We have an
interest in knowing what happens behind the closed doors of many
workplaces. We have interests as consumers or potential business
partners in knowing what kinds of conduct we are supporting through
our support or partnership. We have an interest as potential employees,
too, in knowing what kind of environment we would be signing up for.
And at the broadest social level, we have an interest in learning what
conduct employers are engaging in and what makes workers feel they
have been injured in order to know how to regulate that employment
relationship.
Thus, the ability of workers to tell their stories is important for them
and important for us. The potential for the story to be told is also
important for employers. For companies with more than a few employees
and multiple layers of supervision, it is easy for the owner or top level of
management not to know what conduct lower-level supervisors and
employees might be engaging in. This interferes with production of the
product or delivery of the service the employer provides. Moreover, if a
supervisor or lower-level employee knows that other people will find out
what happened, that person will think twice about engaging in bad
conduct in the first place. Sunshine is the best disinfectant, as they say.
Yet telling a story with a villain and a victim, which is what a story
about an injury often is, is dangerous to the victim in two ways. First,
making that story public invites retaliation by the villain or allies of that
villain, who likely have an interest in the story being kept secret. Second,
110
See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969, 973–75 (2006) (describing how people make hard decisions through the use of
easier heuristics).

Do Not Delete

2012]

5/9/2012 2:36 PM

DECOUPLING EMPLOYMENT

525

portraying oneself as a victim, at least of some kinds of injuries, can cause
those not allied with the villain to punish the victim. For example, people
who claim they have been discriminated against are viewed negatively by
others even when those other people know that the claim is true and that
the person was actually discriminated against.
By removing pieces of our social safety net from the employment
relationship, we would make it easier for employees to leave, easier for
them to tell their stories, and would make them less likely to litigate what
happened to them. We also might make it easier for employers to take
risks in hiring or retaining employees they have concerns about, and
create less of a disincentive for managers to explore their thought
processes more closely. In the end, that is good for all of us.

